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GATEKEEPERS, CULTURAL CAPTIVES, OR KNAVES?
CORPORATE LAWYERS THROUGH DIFFERENT LENSES
Donald C. Langevoort*

I. INTRODUCTION: REMEMBERING CLARK CLIFFORD

Decades ago, I read an interview with Clark Clifford, the
revered Washington lawyer who was facing widely-publicized
charges that he knowingly aided a corporate client (a foreign
banking institution) in violating federal regulatory disclosure
laws.1 Clifford ended the interview by acknowledging that any
reasonable person hearing the facts would come away with only
two possible interpretations: either Clifford was thoroughly venal
or incredibly stupid. By most all accounts he was neither, and
thus was asking the reader to reach deeper for a more
sympathetic understanding of his behavior.
This was a time when the ugly domestic savings and loan
scandals of the 1980s were just winding down. Observers were
famously asking “where were the lawyers?” to demand more
serious legal and disciplinary sanctions against the so-called
gatekeepers who enabled (or closed their eyes to) so much
shameless financial wrongdoing.2 As a corporate/securities
scholar, I was fascinated by the gatekeeper question and, having
*

Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. My thanks
to the participants at the Stein Colloquium for their comments and the stimulating conversation.
1
David E. Rosenbaum, A Charm for Plebian and Patrician, N.Y. Times C-5 (July 30, 1992).
2
See Lincoln Sav. & Loan v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 991, 920 (D.D.C. 1990)(Sporkin, J.). The term
“gatekeeper” had caught on in academic analysis to describe the admixture of legal and
reputational threats that would cause influential persons (particularly investment bankers, auditors
and lawyers) to refuse to allow clients and others to violate the law by withholding essential
services. See Reinier Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Liability Strategy, 2
J. L. Econ. & Org. 53 (1986).
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been at the SEC before academia, instinctively weighed in on the
arguments largely on the pro-enforcement side. But I was also
taken by Clifford’s lament. At the time I was doing research on the
application of social and cognitive psychology to various topics in
business and finance, from which I eventually surmised that there
might be good psychological explanations for why a lawyer like
Clifford could be so close to a client’s situation that he could miss
wrongdoing risks that would seem plain from a greater distance.
So in 1993 I published a law review article that examined the
state of mind standards under the federal securities laws for
professional aiding and abetting (the most common charge
against lawyers), making the claim that highly-engaged lawyers
may not always have the level of actual awareness necessary for
liability in light of then-contemporary psychological research,
circumstantial evidence of complicity notwithstanding.3
To my knowledge, this was the first article to apply social
cognition research to the professional responsibilities of
corporate lawyers.4 For a decade, at least, a handful of legal
scholars had been mining what was coming to be known as
behavioral economics for tractable insights on judgment and
decision making to apply to various other legal subjects,5 so my
move in this direction was not entirely pioneering. But the
corporate field posed unique challenges for a user of these
materials. After years of passive-aggressive disregard, there was
now massive resistance from orthodox law and economics
Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry into Lawyers’
Responsibility for Client Fraud, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 75 (1993). I was still pro-enforcement, and so
this inference was by way of calling for reform with a more sophisticated approach to
intentionality. I extended the argument shortly thereafter in Donald C. Langevoort, The
Epistemology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases and Organizational Behavior,
63 Brook. L. Rev. 629 (1997)(focusing on group-level biases)..
4
There was already an influential literature in the “law and society” movement looking at the
beliefs and behaviors of corporate lawyers by sociologists and cultural anthropologists, including
Robert Nelson’s monumental work PARTNERS WITH POWER (1988). See pp. --- infra.
5
In 1998 I published a literature review of this early work, which had already grown in
prominence and quantity. Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision
Making in Legal Scholarship—A Literature Review, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1499 (1998).
3
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scholars arguing that the heuristics, biases and other cognitive
traits that were being identified with such fanfare had no
purchase in competitive marketplace settings that bountifully
rewarded rationality and harshly punished flawed thinking.6 That
would presumably include corporate lawyers, contrary to what I
was claiming. That was just one of the difficulties in making an
argument like mine. Other commentators—convinced of
widespread lawyer mendacity in the scandals—seemed to want
no part of psychological excuses for enabling client wrongdoing.
Don’t be naïve, they were saying. It was all just about unchecked
greed and envious lawyers who wanted in on the action. The legal
system was the weak point, not the human psyche.7
Fast forward to today, where work in psychology and
behavioral economics is regularly invoked by scholars writing
about lawyers’ professional responsibility, corporate and
otherwise.8 To adherents, at least, there seem to be many
possibilities for adaptive biases to affect marketplace behavior
and the actions of economic elites without being washed out by
the detergent of market discipline and efficiency. Behavioral
ethics has now become an academic sub-discipline of its own.9

6

See Roberta Romano, A Comment on Information Overload, Cognitive Illusions and their
Implications for Public Policy, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 313 (1986). Richard Posner later elaborated on
this theme. Richard Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics and the Law, 50 Stan. L.
Rev. 1551 (1998).
7
Less than a decade later, the massive Enron scandal (with lawyers again allegedly involved)
brought the issue back to both public and scholarly attention. See Milton C. Regan Jr.,
Teaching Enron, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1139 (2005). This was a focal point in drawing more
scholarly attention to lawyers’ behavior.
8
E.g., PAUL BREST & LINDA H. KRIEGER, PROBLEM SOLVING, DECISION MAKING AND
PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT (2010); Paula Schaefer, Behavioral Legal Ethics for Corporate
Counsel, 69 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1 (2019); Jennifer Robbennnolt, Behavioral Ethics Meets Legal
Ethics, 11 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 75 (2015); Andrew Perlman, A Behavioral Theory of Legal
Ethics, 90 Ind. L.J. 1639 (2015); Catherine O’Grady, Behavioral Legal Ethics, Decision Making,
and the New Attorney's Unique Perspective, 15 Nev. L.J. 671 (2015); Jennifer Robbennolt & Jean
Sternlight, Behavioral Legal Ethics, 45 Ariz. St. L.J. 1107 (2013); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Moral
Intuitions and Organizational Culture, 51 St. Louis L. Rev. 971 (2007); Sung Hui Kim,
Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 411 (2008).
9
E.g., Max Bazerrman & Francesca Gino, Behavioral Ethics: Toward a Deeper Understanding of
Moral Judgment and Dishonesty, 8 Ann. Rev. L & Soc. Sci. 85 (2012); Robbennolt, supra.
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For all this progress, however, I am not sure that the
particular questions about lawyers that bothered me long ago
have been well answered. In my writing on the subject, I still hold
to the view that various cognitive (and cultural) biases lead many
lawyers—including, and maybe even especially, elite ones—to
deflect, normalize and rationalize actions that are either illegal or
unethical without compromising their internal self-image as good,
responsible people and good, responsible lawyers.10 The unifying
theme is the extraordinary pervasiveness of self-deception and
hypocrisy in professional and other high-status lives. That said, I
am still sensitive to the claim that the point of view I take—in the
now popular genre of “good people do bad things”—is naïve.
Maybe what I attribute to moral blind spots is more often a
conscious and thus blameworthy form of giving in to pressure and
temptation, maybe even sociopathic.11
This lingering unease was pricked by a recent pair of
articles by two British researchers, Steven Vaughan and Emma
Oakley, who spoke with a number of elite London-based solicitors
about the role of ethics in high-end corporate practice.12 While no
one, of course, said they would ever enable unlawful behavior by a
client (and might even draw the line at extremely troubling but
lawful client behavior), they seemed otherwise completely
10

For my book-length treatment of this ideas as they play out in business and finance generally,
see DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, SELLING RISK: CORPORATIONS, WALL STREET AND
THE DILEMMAS OF INVESTOR PROTECTION (2016); on in house lawyers in particular, see Donald C.
Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable: In-house Lawyers, Enterprise Risk and the Financial
Crisis, 2012 Wisc. L. Rev. 495 (2012).
11
I was also jolted reading an article by a research team including Linda Klebe Trevino, a
pre-eminent organizational behaviorist, describing the behavior of sales managers at a
particular firm who altered reporting routines to falsify information about performance sent
up to senior management. Niki A. den Nieuwenboer, Joao Vieira da Cunha & Linda Klebe
Trevino, Middle Managers and Corruptive Routine Translation: The Social Production of
Deceptive Performance, 28 Org. Sci. 781 (2017). They did this through pressure on their
subordinates. While this setting was ripe for ambiguation and cognitive distortion of the
sort now largely taken for granted in management studies, the article reports a disturbingly
high degree of candor that what they were doing was wrong, yet they were doing it anyway.
12
Steven Vaughan & Emma Oakley, “Gorilla Exceptions” and the Ethically Apathetic Corporate
Lawyer, 19 Legal Ethics 50 (2016); Emma Oakley & Steven Vaughan, In Dependence: The
Paradox of Professional Independence and Taking Seriously the Vulnerabilities of Lawyers in
Large Corporate Law Firms, 46 J. L. & Soc. 83 (2019).
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disinterested in any further public-regarding ethical dimension to
their practice. Clients are in charge: full stop. The authors see
some psychological distancing going on, but were still struck by
how candidly the elite lawyers roundly rejected the idea that
ethics has (or should have) much relevance at all to their work,
given so much professional rhetoric otherwise. If apathy prevails,
maybe the “good people” category deserves to be truncated when
it comes to responsibility for bad things, suggesting something
close to conscious indifference.
These are big issues, and this is a small essay. Here, I simply
want to move things forward in the study of the professional
responsibility of corporate lawyers in two ways that are
somewhat related. One is to push harder on consciousness by
looking more closely at the lengthy continuum—not a binary
yes/no—in the awareness of wrongdoing risk as heavily
influenced by the “slippery slope.” That is a layman’s intuition put
to use well beyond academic research: armchair philosophers
have long understood that the road to hell is not only paved with
good intentions but starts in small, often unconscious steps that
gradually grow larger and hard to stop. Looking at corporate
lawyers’ professional responsibility through this lens has some
interesting, and as far as I can tell, under-explored implications
that help us understand the source of ethical apathy.
The other is to consider the possibility that diminished
interest in gatekeeping ethics among private practitioners might
be offset by greater embrace of the possibility by in-house
lawyers. The remarkable ascension of the general counsel in
authority and status in the corporate setting is something about
which many scholars and practitioners have written, mostly from
a sociological perspective. But there has emerged in recent years
a different lens for the empirical examination of corporate
lawyers, taking the tools of financial economics to seek
correlations (and maybe causation) between identifiable lawyer
5

characteristics and outcomes for the company in terms of (for
example) its legal exposure.13 There is some hopeful news in this
research, albeit heavily contingent on the company’s governance
structure, broadly conceived. So I end by suggesting that, while
the effort in normative legal ethics to enlist corporate lawyers in
more than a legalistic conception of gatekeeping has failed,
corporate governance and corporate ethics—surprisingly,
perhaps—have some potential to enable gatekeeping general
counsels in a way that filters down to the demand for ethicallysensitive outside counsel as well. Good gatekeepers are not
necessarily facing extinction, though stronger species
preservation efforts are surely in order.

II. BEHAVIORAL ETHICS AND SLOW DEGRADATION

The diagnosis that would-be gatekeepers have surrendered
to ethical apathy should surprise no one. As a matter of simple
economics, clients pay the bills and normally prefer that the
professionals they retain facilitate—not frustrate—their chosen
ends. Intense competition among skilled lawyers forces them into
acquiescence. Absent countervailing regulatory or disciplinary
pressures—which have never been all that strong—what is left is
professional integrity, which too easily gives way to norms that
are more conducive to competitive success. Numerous legal
scholars have told versions of this devolution story, from varying
disciplinary perspectives.14
To be sure, we would not expect corporate lawyers to
willfully facilitate client fraud when it exposes them to serious
13

See pp. --- infra.
E.g., JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
(2006); Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49
Md. L. Rev. 869 (1990); Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: A Second
Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1867 (2008).
14
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legal or reputational risks. When and why that occasionally
happens anyway is the Clark Clifford problem. And as mentioned
earlier, the puzzle there is one of good faith: is what goes on
cognitively really about blind spots, or instead something more
culpable? Answering that addresses both the legal issue when the
lawyer seems to have rendered substantial assistance to client
misbehavior and—in a larger category of situations—professional
judgments about the apathetic lawyers who sit idly by while
clients threaten the common good, lawfully or not. So in this
section I revisit the culpability problem that has for so long
bothered me.
The behavioral approach to ethics is a lively field with a
progressive research agenda that identifies much behavior that is
still only dimly understood, so both broad generalizations and
confident conclusions are unwise. But in a rough sense it
deserves the organizing description that it is about good people
doing bad things—there aren’t so many bad apples as bad
barrels.15 That is to say, ordinary (non-sociopathic) people are
naturally inclined to be reasonable and honest but easily tempted
otherwise by self-serving inference, especially in the face of strong
situational incentives and pressures. People cheat less than cold
economic calculations would suggest, but more than they should
under common ethical norms. The main research task is to
discover, by manipulating situational variables, how and when
ordinary behavior turns better or worse than this baseline. The
result over the past four decades or so is a rich body of insights.
There are both popular and scholarly books available; for lawyers
and legal scholars, Yuval Feldman’s recent The Law of Good
People, treats the subject in depth.16

15

Linda Klebe Trevino et al., (Un)ethical Behavior in Organizations, 65 Ann. Rev. Psych. 635
(2014).
16
YUVAL FELDMAN, THE LAW OF GOOD PEOPLE: CHALLENGING THE STATE’S ABILITY TO
REGULATE HUMAN BEHAVIOR (2018). See also, e.g., MAX BAZERMAN & ANN TENBRUNSEL,
BLIND SPOTS: WHY WE FAIL TO DO WHAT’S RIGHT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2011).
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For our purposes, perhaps the most interesting question in
behavioral ethics is one of consciousness: how much in the way of
ethical and legal judgment and decision making happens outside
of consciousness, so that what is processed within awareness is
something of an illusion. The research suggests that there is a
largely amount of automaticity to mental processing, only partly
(if that) subject to the force of cognitive will. This, in turn, has a
strong temporal dimension.
Depending on situational
circumstances, many ethical challenges are initially processed so
that the ethical dimension is hidden from awareness, not
triggering moral anxiety at all. This is pure blind-spot territory,
such that the individual or group’s good intentions go
unchallenged. Sooner or later, the ethical danger cues may come
closer to consciousness but dismissed or downplayed by a
combination of natural cognitive conservatism and motivated
inference (we are often slow to understand what we don’t really
want to know). This is often referred to as ethical fading.17 With
more evidence, there may finally be some awareness, although
rationalizations and denial may still blunt full realization of what
now may be an ethical or legal mess. If and when there finally is a
more unfiltered awareness, the actor is in deep. Then, often
enough, comes the conscious (though still probably rationalized)
cover-up.18
This temporal continuum is a challenge to lawyers and
ethicists used to looking for simple accounts of dispositional
blameworthiness. Awareness is gradual and delayed, often until it
is too late to avoid harm. This is a misfit with many legal
constructs based explicitly on awareness,19 like bad faith, and
certainly points in the direction of lessened culpability even
17

Ann Tenbrunsel & David Messick, Ethical Fading: The Role of Self-Deception in Unethical
Behavior, 17 Soc. Justice Res. 223 (2004).
18
For a classic early work in social psychology describing the institutional manifestation of this,
see Barry Staw, Knee Deep in Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating Commitment to a Chosen Course
of Action, 16 Org. Behav. & Human Dec. Processes 27 (1978).
19 See Langevoort, SELLING HOPE, supra, at 43-45.
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though the decision might be described as negligent or perhaps
even reckless. This is why behavioralists use the good people/bad
things locution. Of course we can and often do blame people
anyway, making an example of them as a lesson to others who
might then be more cognitively awoke. But deterrence doesn’t
necessarily work that way absent draconian threats, in-themoment interventions, or intrusive monitoring, all of which
generate their own problems. In day-to-day routines it is hard to
instill more ethical awareness in people who are wedded to the
assumption that they are good and all is well. Moreover, the act of
judging awareness after the fact of some ethical failure is
hopelessly biased by hindsight, which makes it hard to learn from
experience. On-going work in organizational behavior and
compliance design tries hard to overcome all this, and there are
some promising steps.20 But it remains a challenge, especially in
high-velocity business environments populated by aggressive
risk-takers.21
There is so much more to be said about all of this, but the
interested reader has more than enough to choose from
elsewhere to go more deeply into the research. As noted at the
outset, my question is about relatively how often this blind spot
account accurately describes problematic ethical and legal
behavior as opposed to a more deliberate, consciously calculated
explanation. We can assume that there are plenty of instances of
both, but is there anything to say about the relative distribution?
There are various ways of addressing the consciousness
question, none entirely dispositive. Researchers acknowledge
that laboratory experiments don’t get at this particularly well.
See Hui Chen & Eugene Soltes. Why Compliance Programs Fail and How to Fix Them, 117
Harv. Bus. Rev. (March-April 2018); David Hess, Ethical Infrastructure and Evidence-based
Corporate Compliance and Ethics Programs: Policy Implications from Empirical Evidence. 12
NYU J. L. & Bus. 317 (2017).
21
See Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 933 (2017). This is
a particular challenge in internal efforts to deter high-impact white collar crime. See Todd Haugh,
The Power Few of Corporate Compliance, 53 Ga. L. Rev. 1 (2018).
20
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Asking wrongdoers to recall their thought process—the approach
of Eugene Soltes’ important book Why They Do It: Inside the Mind
of the White Collar Criminal22--is helpful, but one gets the
impression that wrongdoers (especially after a period of
punishment) might not really have the self-insight or recollection
to answer accurately, and may be motivated to construct an
account in hindsight that serves purposes other than accuracy.
Recall that even with significantly impaired awareness at the
beginning of and through much of the course of the misbehavior,
the misconduct may well end with some recognition of guilt,
however softened by lingering rationalizations. Even with that,
Soltes finds substantial variations in the stories, some more
consistent with the cognitive approach,23 others more jaded.

B. The Slippery Slope

In making the case for impaired awareness, I have long
found the idea of the slippery slope compelling. As noted earlier,
it is the idea—amply found in folk wisdom as well as social
science research—that most people will not often go immediately
from their ordinary good behavior to serious impropriety, even
under strong situational pressure. But they will engage in minor
transgressions, finding ample ways to justify the small steps as
not really improper at all.24 Once the first step is taken, however,
the line as to what is permissible moves because of the
rationalization—now that becomes the baseline. The next
temptation is measured not by the starting point, but the revised
definition of ethical or legal acceptability. And so on, as what is
22

EUGENE SOLTES, WHY THEY DO IT: INSIDE THE MIND OF THE WHITE COLLAR CRIMINAL
(2016).
23
Id. at 58 (neuroscience perspectives); 155 (cognitive dissonance); 257-58 (self-deception).
24
David Welsh et al., The Slippery Slope: A Self-regulatory Examination of the Cumulative
Effects of Minor Ethical Transgressions, 100 J. App. Psych. 114 (2015).
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done becomes more harmful. This bears substantial kinship with
the temporal account for delayed awareness, and draws from
work on commitment biases, cognitive dissonance and the like for
why each subsequent step becomes easier (and stopping so much
harder) down an increasingly steep and icy slope. The underlying
idea is a gradual descent into corruption, not a discrete choice.
Much work in behavioral ethics invokes this kind of
gradualism. The famous social psychologist John Darley drew
from it in a notable law review article describing how
corporations become miscreants.25
Of particular note to
corporate lawyers, a study by two financial economists, Catherine
Schrand and Sarah Zechman, looked at companies that found
themselves in legal trouble with the SEC and found fairly
consistent patterns of accounting choices that at the outset were
plausible (if aggressive), with intermediate steps that only
gradually over time crossed the line to financial misreporting.26
That is hard data evidence for the behavioral side.
Schrand and Zechman found something else interesting.
There is lots of social science evidence for many corporate
executives exhibiting an excess of self-confidence and overoptimism, an inflated sense of personal (or senior management
team) efficacy. Firms with overconfident CEOs and CFOs, they
found, were more likely to take the first steps, and end up in
trouble. That makes sense: to the genuinely overconfident, the
first steps (aggressive recognition of income or minimized costs)
would be perceived as honest and realistic. Overconfidence has
emerged as the best example in behavioral economics of an
adaptive bias, i.e. a trait that is not entirely rational but
nonetheless promotes competitive success. It is thus a counterexample to the idea that marketplace pressures wash out all
25

John Darley, The Cognitive and Social Psychology of Contagious Organizational Corruption,
70 Brook. L. Rev. 1177 (2005).
26
Catherine Schrand & Sarah Zechman, Executive Overconfidence and the Slippery Slope to
Financial Misreporting, 15 J. Acct’g & Econ. 311 (2012).
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biases that interfere with the economists’ ideal of Bayesean
rationality.
I have long relied on both overconfidence and the slippery
slope in making the case for behavioral ethics.27 In a strikingly
evocative way, neuroscientists have now joined in.28 Using
magnetic imaging of the brain during ethics-related laboratory
experiments, they have found that the amygdala is normally
strongly activated by ethical stress (pressures to misbehave).
That emotions-driving portion of the brain plays a big role in
doing what’s right. But if there is a small step toward cheating,
the level of activation goes down slightly in the next opportunity.
This goes on and on, down the slippery slope. Gradually, the
amygdala’s electrical energy dims to indifference.
The study of slippery slopes in behavioral ethics tends to be
focused on discrete choices that lead to a wrongful act. In that
framing, it does weigh in on the side of diminished or delayed
awareness. But it raises an interesting question if we extend the
timeline. Suppose, over many years perhaps, a person makes
gradual ethical compromises down the slippery slope in pursuit of
competitive success, without suffering any serious penalty. When
ethical (or legal) stresses arise again, does the decision-making
reset to the starting point of innocence or instead, do all the prior
compromises accumulate, cognitively, so that they are essentially
starting out part way down, already unbalanced?
If so, it raises the possibility that character becomes
corrupted by earlier ethical compromises even when unrelated to
the particular dilemma at hand. Then the question becomes
whether this priming brings the person sooner to an actual
awareness that they are cheating, as they have done before, or
27

See Langevoort, SELLING HOPE, supra, at 26-27, 35-37.
Neil Garrett et al., The Brain Adapts to Dishonesty, 19 Nature Neuroscience 1727 (2016). For a
commentary, see Jan B. Engelmann & Ernst Fehr, The Slippery Slope of Dishonesty, 19 Nature
Neuroscience 1543 (2016).
28
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whether this whole process stays out of consciousness. If the
former, it suggests that habits of compromise gradually impair
character generally, perhaps with less cognitive resistance to the
implications. In other words, more unfiltered wrongdoing,
contrary to the behavioral account—people willing and able to
admit, to themselves at least and maybe to others, that they had
greater awareness that they were cheating from the start, but had
largely stopped caring (i.e., ethical apathy).

C. Corporate Lawyers

So we now turn this account specifically to the world of
corporate lawyers and their capacity as gatekeepers. Though I am
by no means suggesting that that ethical compromises are
everyday occurances, lawyers do seem to get into legal and ethical
muck often enough, whether in the form of insider trading29 or the
facilitating of client fraud, as in the opinion mills that churn out
false representations of legal compliance with resale restrictions
under the securities laws so as to enable unlawful distributions
that too often take the form of pump and dump.30 A 60 Minutes
sting operation that showed multiple New York lawyers more
than ready to help hide the unsavory identity of a prospective
client wanting to engage in a high-end real estate transaction (and
actually led to bar discipline against some of them) surely

Even when the lawyer in question is the company’s insider trading compliance officer. See
SEC Charges former Senior Attorney at Apple with Insider Trading, Feb. 13, 2019, available at
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-10.
30
See Robert Freidel, Beware of Lawyers Bearing Gifts (In rhe Form of Rule 144 Opinions),
April 4, 2010, available at https://www.pepperlaw.com/publications/beware-of-lawyers-bearinggifts-with-respect-to-rule-144-opinions-2010-04-14/.
29
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resonated among members of the public inclined to see lawyers as
fixers and hired guns.31
Those of us who have spent time with (or were) corporate
lawyers know that the public perceptions are stereotypes, and
that the vast majority of corporate lawyers present as “good
people.” This invites us to think in terms of behavioral
explanations when—like Clark Clifford—they are accused of
doing bad things. But if it were possible, what would a deep moral
census of corporate lawyers reveal? How willing are lawyers to
willingly step over the legal line to aid a client’s economic
interests, after having made the Holmesian “bad man” risk
calculation as to both client and self? Or assuming that legal and
reputational risk has properly been managed, how many of them
would do harm to another simply because the client’s self-interest
called for it? The latter recreates the laboratory situation that
started the field of behavioral ethics: measuring the incidence of
cheating under circumstances where there are real gains to be
had and zero chance of detection. I have no idea what that census
would reveal regarding the state of professional responsibility
among business lawyers, other than the strong suspicion that
lawyers’ ethics and respect for law run along a lengthy spectrum
and that clients sniff out these preferences to match their own.
Much of this, as noted earlier, tends toward apathy.
There are a number of findings in behavioral ethics to
support the idea that lawyers would be particularly susceptible to
slippery slopes. There is norm ambiguity: the ample (and largely
aspirational) principles of professional responsibility for the
public good sit in the shadow of counter-balancing demands of
zealous representation, confidentiality and loyalty.
Ample
research shows that people will cheat in the interest of significant
31

60
Minutes:
Anonymous
Inc.,
Aug.
28,
2016,
available
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/hidden-camera-investigation-money-laundering-60-minutes/.
This led to bar disciplinary proceedings against some of those caught in the sting.
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others to a greater extent than for their own good.32 Helping a
client out via what is processed cognitively as a benign and not
unreasonable step into the ethical gray area comes easily, even
though it then moves the baseline for next time. Lawyers covet
being thought of as problem-solvers for their clients, which puts
pressure on them to live up to expectations as a matter of
professional identity. Interviews with law-breakers reveal how
the first steps toward abject criminality in business settings were
often by people who did a little too much not to let others down,
and then couldn’t stop once committed to the course of action (a
form of cognitive dissonance).33
The often subjective nature of the law also makes the slope
more slippery. As with ethical precepts, vague legal principles
invite interpretation in a self-serving fashion, without awareness
of the biased construal. Yuval Feldman, most notably, has done
considerable work on the connection between legal ambiguity
and actions that set a course toward questionable judgment at
least, and a heightened risk of subsequent violations.34
Next is the matter of culture and group identity, which to an
extent goes back to self-definition as a reliable problem-solver.35
There is a very famous study of cheating behavior, where the
subjects were all European bankers.36 Their conduct in the
control conditions were little different from other professionals—
moderate cheating behavior at most. But one group of subjects
had their identities as bankers primed just before the testing, and
this group had higher rates of dishonesty. I am not aware that a
comparable study has been done of lawyers, but it would be
32

Francesca Gino & Dan Ariely, Self-Serving Altruism: The Lure of Unethical Actions that
Benefit Others, 93 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 285 (2013).
33
See Clinton Free & Pamela Murphy, The Ties that Bind: The Decision to Co-offend in Fraud,
32 Contemp. Acct’g Res. 18 (2015); see also Soltes,, supra, at 155,
34
See Feldman, supra; Yuval Feldman & Doran Teichman, Are All Legal Probabilities Created
Equal?, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 980 (2009).
35
Soltes, supra, at 189, 233.
36
Alain Cohn et al., Business Culture and Dishonesty in the Banking Industry, 516 Nature 86
(2014).
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interesting to see what that would invoke cognitively. Whatever
the finding, I think it would be a glimpse into precisely how—in
terms of ethics—the role of lawyering is interpreted by lawyers
themselves.
Tying all this together for our purposes is the concept of
ethical depletion.37 Research shows that being ethical is harder
cognitive work than giving into temptation.
So resisting
temptation depletes energy over time; tiredness and stress, in
turn, increases the likelihood of further cheating. And corporate
lawyers, by all accounts, inhabit workplaces filled with staminachallenging workloads, along with many other competitive
stressors tied to promotion, status and compensation. Greater
cheating is associated with falling just short of goals and achieving
competitive success.38
The slippery slope would have less danger were the earliest,
largely innocent, steps subject to corrective feedback in terms of
being called out for the behavior, or maybe even sanction. That is
indeed an important intervention in building good ethics and
compliance. But here again, various forces conspire against this
kind of discipline. Various cognitive biases affect supervisors and
peers so as to make them less willing and able to perceive and act
on warning signs.39 Even when the conduct crosses the line into
actual illegality, enforcement resources and incentives are such
that only a small fraction of wrongdoing is detected and dealt with
via sanction. In that sense, as I’ve written elsewhere, the absence
of negative feedback adds ice to the slope by allowing ethical and
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legal risk-takers to claim greater status and rewards.40 They
become the winners, and their style of behavior—the can-do,
aggressive client-server—becomes something to be envied and
copied.
I realize that what I have done here is largely to make a
somewhat updated case for a behavioral approach to
understanding corporate lawyers’ ethical behavior—why good
lawyers, however sanctimonious, may act less ethically than the
professional ideal and do things somewhere along the spectrum of
bad acts. This still leaves open what they are conscious of as they
misbehave—the degree of culpable intent in any given case. But
the more I think about the slippery slope, the more I see it in
terms of wearing down the protective defenses of lawyers caught
in high stress settings. We should at least think about this
dynamic of professional apathy, and the cultural effects it is likely
to generate.

III. IN-HOUSE: LESSONS FROM FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
GOVERNANCE

AND

CORPORATE

The British studies demonstrating such considerable ethical
apathy focused on lawyers in elite law firms. As noted, some
portion of this can be explained by shifts in the demand for legal
services, which may not value long-standing lawyer-client
relationships so much as “just in time” specialist interventions,
robbing the attorney of the ability to develop the deep familiarity
with the client and the build-up of trust and credibility necessary
to take a strong ethical stance. My suspicion is that that what we
hear from these lawyers is either a form of total depletion at the
bottom of the slippery slope or (from the more junior ones who
40
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haven’t yet succumbed) the expression of an internal firm-wide
culture that signals that form of ethical surrender.
That shift in private practice was accompanied by a rapid
growth in the power and authority of the in-house general counsel
(and her team) as the ones who select and supervise the
outsiders.41 This role expansion also brought with it the ability to
internalize more expert competencies, such that outside law firms
had less to do (and thus competed more vigorously with each
other for the externalized work). So an obvious point to consider
is that whatever gatekeeping role might have been played by
outside counsel was itself internalized, so that we have to look
there for evidence of its presence or absence. In his admirable
writings on the contemporary role of the general counsel, Ben
Heineman makes the somewhat optimistic claim that in-house
counsel “operate seamlessly in business teams, gaining credibility
by helping more swiftly to achieve performance goals and by
assisting business leaders promote high integrity down the line
inside the corporation,” the result of which is a “smaller total legal
spend (inside plus outside) for the company.”42
Heineman’s view runs up against the image of the in-house
lawyer as the CEO’s loyal consigliere, ready to do what it takes to
promote the corporate agenda, not to be anybody’s good
conscience. While that caricature is surely over-drawn, doubts
about internal professional independence abound. For this
reason, in-house lawyers have been studied in depth. Most of the
work here uses the tools of sociology and cultural anthropology—
learning what goes on inside the firm by observing and asking.
Nelson and Nelson’s tripartite division of in-house lawyers into
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“cops, counsel and entrepreneurs” is a justly famous rendering.43
But as noted earlier, there are doubters who wonder how well
ethnography and structured interviews get deeply into what is
actually believed and done inside societal institutions as opposed
to what is revealed to strangers. Even trained observers may see
what they want to see amidst the fog. My intention here is not to
weigh in on subjectivity and rigor except to say that the
methodological criticism has led some sociologists to a more
quantitative, data-driven approach to empirical observation. That
has led to an interesting convergence with work in financial
economics, which has long used the same quantitative methods as
the gold standard for proof as to testing how preferences and
behaviors match the predictions of economic theory. In the last
decade, and mainly with respect to the general counsel, this has
been put to work to understand corporate lawyering.
The results are interesting, if far from determinative.
Perhaps the best known is by Morse et al.,44 who estimate that
general counsel are nearly half as important as CEO preferences in
determining outcomes over a range of activities involving
financial reporting, compliance monitoring and business
development. This is a surprisingly large effect. Other work
shows how senior corporate lawyers affect accounting choices,
reporting quality, voluntary disclosure policy, and insider trading
enforcement, mostly for the better as general counsel prominence
increases. A natural subject of inquiry is whether the
compensation packages of general counsel affect these outcomes,
especially when laden with stock options and other incentives.
Here, Morse et al. show that high powered incentives cause the
general counsel to redirect time and attention away from general
compliance monitoring toward strategic business development
43
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activity, which has a more immediate payoff. As a result, they
prevent some 25% fewer breaches. So incentives do seem to
matter.
This is important research for lawyers to pay attention to,45
even if some of the assumptions about the law will occasionally
cause legally-trained readers to cringe. Much of the discussion
refers to the presumed gatekeeper role of the in-house lawyer,
suggesting that the good news in terms of disclosure and the like
demonstrates good gatekeeper behavior while increasing risk
tolerance, for example, evidences bad gatekeeping. But that does
not show whether the lawyer is doing anything more than
keeping the client out of trouble. Morse et al. even push back
against the idea that the shift in attention to more strategic
functions is an abandonment of a crucial gatekeeper role, claiming
that if more attention to strategy is profitable vis-à-vis the risks of
not catching violations, there is nothing necessarily wrong from a
corporate governance perspective.
Gatekeeping implies more, however, in terms of a
commitment to law-abidingness (and perhaps other integritybased values) whether or not justified by cost-benefit calculations.
We have no direct evidence in these particular studies of pay-offs
one way or the other in terms of who benefits or is harmed by
more intense monitoring—the firm itself, its managers,
shareholders or some more diffuse set of stakeholders?
That, of course, is the subject of corporate governance.
While the law is famously murky, there is plenty of rhetoric about
the duty of (long-term) shareholder wealth maximization that
seems to suggest that individual strategic choices are a matter of
business judgment so long as they stay within the known confines
45
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of the law. If so, then the studies seem to suggest that all is
(relatively) well, but any more capacious role for gatekeeping is
unrealistic.
But Heineman makes a good case for advice that merges law
and ethics, delivered with acute sensitivity to chain of command
and business constraints. Public companies, especially, can face
harsh legal and reputational consequences by mishandling a
manageable threat so that it turns into a disaster for the company.
As we saw, there is data supporting the view that general counsels
do often act as gatekeepers, so long as their pay packages are
properly aligned with that function. Wise CEOs should welcome
their advice. By way of one provocative example, the economists
Harrison Hong and Inessa Liscovich46 provide evidence that
attention to corporate social responsibility correlates with more
leniency in criminal prosecutions against corporations for
violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
So perhaps the powers that be should appreciate and
encourage such ethical proactivity. But that style of general
counsel work is contingent on prioritization by the CEO and
(arguably) key members of the board of directors. Some of this is
directly about agency costs inside the company: the senior
management team may, out of preference or pressure, be shifting
its focus to the short-term in ways that may instruct the general
counsel to be aggressive in response to all threats to the status
quo, a threat-rigidity response. In principle, the CEO may want
wise counsel about the company’s reputational and legal risk. In
reality, that may be processed through a very self-serving point of
view. While that is surely a risk, there are pressures on boards to
take a stronger role in legal compliance, and reforms (in board
compensation, for example) that could be employed to motivate
this. Only when a general counsel is willing to make the board
46
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fully informed of tough situations will there be the support
needed to pursue the best interest of the corporation rather than
the self-interest of those caught in too deep—even if the result of
greater candor is to raise the board’s own liability exposure a
bit.47
The evidence seems to be that significant numbers of
general counsel do their job well, though how they do so remains
opaque. But culture matters. Good examples of cultures likely to
cut off the would-be gatekeeper are not hard to find—Tesla is a
good one, apparently. Elizabeth Pollman has written about the
not-unusual company (think Uber) that celebrates its role as
disrupter in pushing the envelope—or deliberately crossing the
line—on legal compliance in the name of innovation.48 That was a
back-story at Enron, where there was a grandiose internal belief
that the company was creating a new paradigm for the delivery of
energy around the world in the face of entrenched habits and
mindless rules. They deserved to be violated. Of course, the
slippery slope is at work here, with a large sucking machine at the
bottom speeding up the downward slide as ethical
accommodations multiply.
This is just to emphasize the contingency of in-house
gatekeeping. Many corporate leaders will see the value; many
others don’t. So Heineman is right to urge careful due diligence
on general counsel candidates to look deeply into the prevailing
climate at any given opportunity. But that is very hard—culture
reveals itself only after rites of passage are faithfully completed—
especially for someone who really wants the job. And it doesn’t
much matter if the person that anxious to be a good gatekeeper
A reading of the Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion in City of Birmingham Ret. System v.
Good, 177 A.3d 47 (Del. 2017) is a troubling example of a board that avoids personal liability
because they did not know enough, and where the company’s lawyers lack of candor may have
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spot.
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doesn’t get that job offer from the corporate thrill-seekers in the
first place.

V. CONCLUSION

Essays about professional responsibility should try to end
on a hopeful note, so I can’t stop at the previous sentence. Nor do
I want to fall prey to naïve (or motivated) cynicism, which
psychologists have identified as the common over-estimation of
the selfishness (or apathy) of others so as to rationalize
responsive self-serving behavior by the observer. Good and bad
ethics are contagious, so that a downward spiral in morality can
be performative even if the underlying behavioral assumptions
are inaccurate and might someday be exposed as such.
That said, I don’t think that the institutional structures exist
to motivate more than the minimum of gatekeeping by corporate
lawyers. I keep coming back to the image of the dimming
amygdala. Law firm cultures are doing other work that does not
include drawing attention to public needs; individual lawyers
become depleted in the face of stress. Clients are to be served,
with appreciation for the assignment, not skepticism about its
motives. The demand side has won triumphantly. So the supply
side (the corporate legal profession itself) is not going to be the
best place to find something better.
Rather, we have to look to the demand side, and pose the
question of whether corporate governance has something to add.
The “business case for ethics” or “ethics pays” approach is
problematic, of course—justifying ethics based on its pay-off
monetizes morality and deprives it of its core function in
promoting goodness as a stand-alone virtue. And so many
scandals seem not to give us much hope that good ethics is
23

pervasive in highly-competitive organizations. I have given much
of my scholarly attention to explaining why that is so, thereby
polishing my credentials as a pessimist.
But I believe that this perspective, while solidly based and
descriptively accurate, is socially constructed and thereby
contingent. That’s where the financial economics work is so
interesting—there are, it seems, significant numbers of firms that
welcome good gatekeeping, just as there are many more that do
not. The corporate social license (i.e., the demands of publicness)
is increasingly difficult to earn, and easily put at risk. A good
general counsel is a prized commodity in managing that risk, if
supported by the CEO, the board and—under the best of
conditions—the internal corporate culture. Ben Heineman’s
model, in other words.
That model goes in competition with the opposite: the
attack dog general counsel willing to do whatever it takes to win,
supported by like-minded bosses and more grease-laden cultures.
Many will confidently place their bets on the latter, and they may
be right, especially in the zeitgeist of today’s ill-spirited political
economy. But I’ve seen enough research on sustainability, human
capital, halo effects and the like to, for now, hold onto my chips
and, if the odds make it worthwhile, even bet some on the good
guys. In other words, I can dimly see a future (without predicting
one) where the norms of corporate governance shift to favor firms
with genuinely influential general counsels who speak both law
and ethics.49 If so, given the demand side dominance of the
profession, the image of the lawyer-gatekeeper may be
reawakened throughout the profession, shaking it out of its
apathy and nudging it off the slippery slope.
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